The Evolving Situation in Afghanistan and Some Brass Tacks

HardNews - "How is the situation there?" is a question one is not infrequently asked about Afghanistan from outside. The situation being grim, the answer, "Quite serious" often works to close out talk on the subject. But sometimes, depending on the locus standii of the questioner, there are further queries, and then, time and mood being suitable, a discussion could ensue -- involving geopolitics, regional and super power aims and policies, international narcotics trade, Afghan domestic politics, Islam, more so: radical militant Islam, NATO military strategy, tactics and operations, and Taliban guerilla warfare and propaganda, et al.

The fact of the matter is: things are really quite serious, and getting worse each day - as seen from the viewpoint of someone interested in peace in Afghanistan, - not the icy peace of a morgue or a 'peace' enforced by the edge of the sword, but a meaningful peace engendering progress and human happiness.

Almost nine years since October 2001 when it expelled from Afghanistan the Taliban regime of Mullah Omer, the US, leading a 43 nation coalition, appears unable to suppress Al Qaeda or the Pakistan-based armed insurgency - funded by Saudis and the narcotics trade. Even as insurgency now actually has grown and menaces all of Afghanistan, more than ever, and is making inroads also into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan, public opinion in the countries forming the coalition is turning increasingly averse to continued military involvement in Afghanistan.

As a possible further complication, nomad Kuchi-Hazara armed conflict is apprehended in the near future, over grazing rights in the central Hazarjat highland region of Afghanistan. This involves potential internal ethnic and sectarian strife - Kuchis being nomad Pashtun Sunni Muslims, whose movement of sheep flocks to grazing areas in the highlands is resented and opposed by the Shia Hazaras.

Kabul City itself being populated on tribal and ethnic lines, the possibility exists of consequent tension and ethnic conflict in Kabul as well. Yet another complication in this connexion is that the Uzbek community, known for its ferocious fighters, is presently said to be aligned with the Hazaras. The situation lends itself to exploitation by the armed opposition and its sponsors; equally by elements in Iran supportive to Shias in Afghanistan.

Various factors are cited for the worsening state of affairs. It is standard for western media to carry critical reviews of the Government about not eliciting enough popular local approbation and support to pit the people of the country against the armed opposition, and for being unable to implement the latter two components of the 'Clear, Hold and Build' approach of the iconic ISAF Commander, Gen. McChrystal.

The Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and other security agencies are found fault with for lacking the necessary efficiency and commitment. Sub-national governance authorities are pilloried for inadequacies in local administration.

But such reports do not pass muster as unbiased or adequate representation of the factual position.

Significant governmental achievements in Afghanistan, e.g. the fact of 7 million children now going to school, including millions of girl children - (who the Taliban would prefer being kept illiterate, sequestered and walled-in at home) - are achievements claimed by foreign donor agencies and governments, not attributed to the Afghan Government to which credit is in fairness due for executing the difficult task of such important social sector reform.

Similarly, given the constraints in face of severe challenges, Afghan security authorities have performed commendably to thwart and combat terrorism. Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, and Director General of National Security Directorate Amrullah Saleh, are exceptionally capable leaders under whom no effort is spared by the security authorities to exercise utmost vigilance round the clock.

The sheer bravery, alacrity and fighting qualities of even the ordinary policemen, let alone special anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency commando units, is to be seen to be believed.

Indeed, there is much to be learned from Afghanistan in the matter of counter-terrorism and counter insurgency tactical operations.

However, scarcely is credit assigned by the international community to the yeoman services of Afghan security forces.

In contrast, the international media and visiting leaders of foreign governments routinely shower praise on the performance of the Coalition forces.

It is also not rare for these quarters, in the event of a breach of security, to be quick to blame Afghan security services, rather than admit any default on the part of the much better equipped international security forces deployed in the area.

Much hue and cry is raised about corruption in Afghanistan's public administration, but few if any reports are carried by the international media of undeniable corruption in the working of international organizations and NGOs which handle an estimated eighty per cent of expenditure on public works in Afghanistan. There is the case of an auditor of an international agency's operations, whose services were terminated because he persisted in investigating a substantial fraud detected during inspection of accounts. Auditors of expenditure of international agencies are often staggered by the scale of irregularities.

It is a moot point whether observers in the Coalition remain unaware of stark realities or prefer to stay in denial. The operative policies concerning investment and use of military and developmental resources are only superficially effective in dealing with the challenges of insurgency and under development in Afghanistan. This is because the measures merely treat the outward symptoms of the problems, rather than acting against underlying causes.

The roots of the insurgency in Afghanistan, now endemic and infecting countries to its immediate north as well as further afield, are to be found in the ambitions of those who promote, and cooperate to spread, extreme fundamentalist militant Islam, i.e. Wahhabism, and its incitement to violence and the aspiration for global Islamic conquest and a worldwide Islamic Emirate.

The generic causes for the situation in Afghanistan are: the strategic conviction and commitment of the regime in Saudi Arabia in nexus with Wahhabism to propagate and proliferate radical Islam; immense Saudi funding of the madrassa movement spawning Islamic fanatics in the entire region from Saudi Arabia across Pakistan and Afghanistan into Central Asia and the subcontinent of India; Pakistan-based Jehadi recruitment, training, deployment, tactical guidance, and safe haven facility; all this supported by active collusion of the ruling military elite in Pakistan - the latter sustained by colossal military and financial aid from external sources and political cover from powerful capitals and chanceries.

This underlying reality is not targeted by the political doctrine, policy, and military operations of the US-led Coalition in Afghanistan, and thus, notwithstanding the stupendous scale of resources deployed in Afghanistan, the Coalition effort is proving to be futile, indeed counterproductive. It is indeed mystifying to see this allowed to happen.

Despite prolonged engagement in Afghanistan in the laudable avowed cause of upholding international law, peace and security, the NATO coalition is far from being a popular entity in Afghanistan. There is palpable and increasing alienation on account of incidents of 'collateral noncombatant casualties', and perceived offense to deeply-held traditional cultural mores and sensibilities of the local populace.

Some instances of wrongful and excessive use of force that have come to light are shocking to a degree, and clearly merit specialized criminal investigation by the military authorities concerned. Such inflammatory cases provide violent incitement to Islamic radicalization and militancy.

With the background of years on end of futile Coalition operations, the US, to the detriment of its image in Afghanistan as a military power, is now widely perceived to be preparing to abandon the field in Afghanistan. This is seen as a public admission of failure by yet another super power in face of the indomitable Afghan fighting spirit.

Suspicions are rife in the Afghan public mind of the US intending to entrust to Pakistan's military rulers, sway over the country. It is equally widely presumed that with the US withdrawing from the theater, other NATO partners will not lag behind in leaving too.

Such departure from the regional theater of operations will only embolden and boost the very forces of international terrorism that pose a threat to not just Afghanistan and the region but indeed to world civilization. The recent Times Square incident in New York shows that radical Islamic terrorism should never be underestimated.

Afghanistan's President, Hamid Karzai, the one Afghan leader with an inclusive 'big tent' approach in respect of Afghanistan's myriad ethnicities, has initiated steps towards holding a 'Jirga' - Afghanistan's traditional consultative process to decide important issues - to evolve a national consensus on interacting with the armed opposition with a view eventually to ending the insurgency and achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan.

In many important respects the initiative serves a great cause - of Peace in the region and the world. Interests that withhold support to or undermine this exercise appear poorly advised. The urge to meet, consult in the traditional way, and work to evolve a national consensus, is based on serious apprehensions about the trends underway.

This effort aimed at resolution of conflict through dialogue, and the security measures underway to combat the armed opposition, should be seen as mutually reinforcing and complementary.

Meanwhile, an international conference in Kabul, of donors and governments - as a follow up to the London Conference of January 2010 - is also on the cards.

Parliamentary elections are scheduled on September 18, 2010 - needing financial support from the international community. A distinguished personality, respected for his exceptional ability and impeccable integrity, Abdullah Ahmadzai, has been appointed by President Karzai to be the CEO of the Secretariat of the Independent Election Commission. The appointment will raise the credibility of this important institution - reviled endlessly in the western press during the last elections.

Support of the US, the European Community, Japan, India, China, Pakistan, Central Asian States, the CIS, and the UN, is crucial to all these initiatives.

It is in such a context that the visit to the US of President Karzai is scheduled: May 10-14, 2010, for which energetic preparations are underway both in Washington and Kabul.

With the prospect of having largely to stand on its own in the event of any sizeable exit of the Coalition forces, Afghanistan will value what is offered by the US and friendly countries and power centers the world over, in terms of political and financial support to Afghanistan's nation-building activity.

Meanwhile the US-led Coalition will no doubt look to ensuring and insuring its long term aims and interests in and around Afghanistan, whilst contemplating a strategic withdrawal from combat scenarios in Afghanistan.

Among other objectives in the region, a substantive unfulfilled US interest, over the last decade and more, remains the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.

The real potential guarantors of the security of the project will be those with the wherewithal to wield local kinetic dominance in the terrain that the pipeline will traverse in Afghanistan and Baluchistan up to the desired sea coast port terminals. However, self reliance to the maximum extent in this respect is best.

Can any guarantees of support to the project from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia be treated as credible? Will US investment in the project to build and operate the pipeline not risk being just another major hostage to Pakistan-based and Saudi funded insurgent threat?

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have their own reasons not to be enthusiastic about the pipeline and hence to not be supportive.

The Saudis view with disapproval any purchase of hydrocarbon resources by the US outside Saudi Arabia - as to that extent diminishing US dependence on Saudi oil supplies, and disapprove also the emergence of any competitive oil exporter that potentially may resist falling in line with Saudi preferences concerning world wide pricing of oil.

The Saudis also view with disfavor any prolonged perpetuation of US influence in the region - which they apprehend will interfere with Saudi policy of radicalizing Central Asian States - using tenets of Wahhabi Islam.

The Saudis also see US involvement in Central Asia as creating basis for USentrepreneurial entrenchment in Baluchistan, and leading to US domination and blockage of a key region in the focus of Saudi aspirations.

The Pakistanis, whilst acutely aware that a key US interest requiring Pakistan's oversight or support will always induce substantive financial and military US backing to Pakistan, are also aware of the consequences of doing anything disapproved of by the Saudis, or the Chinese, and have independent additional reservations also relative to the TAP pipeline project.

Ideally, the Pakistanis would like themselves to exploit not just Turkmenistan's but all of Central Asia's natural resources. However, sorely lacking the capacity to do so, they are anxious not to rub not just Saudi Arabia but Red China also the wrong way - the latter having its own designs and plans underway so far as Central Asian natural resources are concerned.

Far preferable it is to Pakistan for the US and its allies simply to leave Afghanistan; - the region 'outsourced' to Pakistan's management, costs and profits on account of doing so being generously underwritten by the US; or, in the alternative, for the US to remain mired, struggling in Afghanistan, and therefore dependant on Pakistan for regional logistic, political and military cooperation.

The Pakistanis, although cognizant of risks, may be expected, as in the past, if they perceive an advantage for themselves, to be quite willing to facilitate the Iranians - even if detrimental to US interests, and particularly if further approbation of the Chinese is to be secured.

The Chinese have plans for extension of rail, road and strategic communications from the Karakoram region south-west through Pakistan to Gwadar and Karachi ports, and to expand communications between Gwadar and Karachi.

This is related to the coveted aim of connecting consuming and manufacturing capacities in China with a sea port near the Straits of Hormuz, as much to exploit mineral and other natural resources in Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and build a strategic naval facility adjoining the mouth of the Gulf region, compassing the Arabian Sea and its rim: the coastlines of Africa, peninsular India, and Sri Lanka; and access the blue water southern Indian Ocean region.

The Chinese have a long range vision towards building China's rise to super power status, displacing the global economic, political and military preponderance of the US. Afghanistan and Baluchistan are key pieces in Chinese perspectives and policy formulation.

Mindful of all the foregoing considerations, many purposes are to be served if the US eventually does arrive at and execute the right strategy in and around Afghanistan.

The right strategy involves clarity and fullness of perception that the key to mastering the whole situation, indeed towards getting into position to drive world events in the immediate future as well as in the unfolding decades of this century, is not principally Afghanistan, but centered in and controlling and dominating Baluchistan and key locations in the border districts from Chitral to Baluchistan. (Incidentally, this is the territory dreamed of by the great freedom fighter and Pashtun hero, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan as comprising his cherished 'Pashtoonistan'.)

The right strategy also involves eschewing by the US of any appeasement of all forces that propagate Wahhabism or cooperate with and connive in doing so.

Purposeful, inexorable, practical action must be taken firmly to curb and suppress Wahhabism.

The right strategy also entails exerting irresistible and implacable pressure, on the military elite in Pakistan as well as the Saudi regime, and unambiguous warnings of the action that shall follow if there is any form of support to terrorism.

Strict vigilance is necessary to ensure adherence by these respective governments and agencies to first principles and canons of international law.

Come mid-July 2011, the US, as announced by the young President - intent, no doubt, on fulfilling past campaign pledges in the early stages of the run up to another election period, - may well begin withdrawing forces in Afghanistan to non-combat locations.

It is essential to locate appreciable force in well-selected encampments in Baluchistan and at places on the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier region, including the newly named 'Khyber Pakhtunkhwa' province of Pakistan.

Doing so will confer vital, decisive, strategic and tactical leverage relative to the entire region, concentric spaces around it, and vis-à-vis all the key players having stakes therein.

It is in this area that the US-led Coalition should have operated from the first to tackle and eliminate the menace posed by Al Qaeda and Taliban.

Any refusal by Pakistan to cooperate in this respect should be viewed and declared as complicity with the enemy, and be heavily penalized as such.

Pakistan should never be allowed on the one hand to plead inability to take effective action against terrorists based in Pakistan, and, on the other hand, to refuse to allow action to be taken by a foreign government responsible for the security of its citizens under attack or threat of attack by terrorists based in Pakistan.

The developing international situation affected by international terrorism based in Pakistan requires a strong kinetic presence of the US in key locations in Pakistan: Baluchistan and the districts from Chitral to Baluchistan. The US must assert itself in this respect so long as the problem is ended.

It is to be noted that the US has maintained military bases in the region from the early years of Pakistan, and has added to these - not the least now being the Shamsi base in Baluchistan : 27' 51" North, 65'10" East : stationing US drones; Googleable.

The need of the hour is to develop adequate encampment of re-located US and Coalition forces in Pakistan.

When Pax Britannia ruled and 'the sun never set on the British Empire', it was because British strategists and policy makers did not shy away from bold and forceful action in accord with strategic realities.

In the context of Central Asia, South and West Asia, they fully grasped the significance to empire defense of organizing location of military power in this specific area, Baluchistan and the frontier districts up to Chitral - and from quite early times too.

In 1893, the British imposed upon Afghanistan's then ruler, the tenacious but beleaguered Amir Abdur'Rehman, the so-called 'Durand Line', known as such after Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of the then imperial Government of India, - the 'Durand Line' being an unsurveyed and undelineated boundary, marked inexpertly in smudgy blue chalk on a defective map.

In 1947, the British Government, led by Prime Minister Clement Atlee of the Labour Party, operated again in accord with British strategic interests, and maneuvered the configuration and coming into being of 'Pakistan', and Pakistan's inheritance of the chain of vital border districts - from Baluchistan to Chitral - on the British side of the 'Durand Line.'

All things considered, the US is the world's paramount power, the ultimate arbiter of aggregate equities, and must comport itself as such in international affairs, especially relative to critical world crises -- for a better future for all.

The author is a senior advisor in the office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan