IT would be wishful thinking that in future, our security institutions will prevent the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or other militants from repeating something such as the Bannu jailbreak two months ago.
The media-savvy militants have made no bones about the fact that they are planning more attacks for the release of their jailed comrades.
In a 35-minute video, TTP leaders disclosed the way in which the Bannu jailbreak strategy was crafted. This constitutes a telling example of the sorry state that our security affairs are in. Not a single bullet was fired to repulse the raiding party, nor did the staff of the surrounding police stations or the security forces stationed at entry and exit points resist in any way the militants’ flight back to Fata.
It is worrisome to see TTP desperadoes descending freely on settled districts to challenge the state and society. Sometimes, one gets the impression that the security of the country is in the wrong hands. As one political observer from Bannu put it, “the Taliban deserve appreciation for not raiding the settled districts regularly, because the authorities hardly care about stopping them effectively”.
Looking at the shifting terror strategies, one is taken aback by the way militants have kept the flames of terror alive in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Last year saw a turn in their modus operandi after they launched a series of cross-border raids. Hundreds of Taliban fighters from Swat, hiding in the bordering Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, took part in each attack. In some four major cross-border offensives last year the militants systematically targeted civilians and security forces, killing about 150 people in Dir and Chitral districts.
One such attack, carried out on August in the Arandu tehsil of Chitral, is revealing from a security viewpoint. The then district coordination officer of Chitral, Rehmatullah Wazir, sensed something unusual in the air prior to the attack. Similarly, Afghans visiting the local markets in Darosh tehsil informed locals that militants were buying animals for transporting weapons across the border. Local newspapers carried such threats as front-page news.
Over 200 militants penetrated 25 km into Pakistan to engage several security posts for over five hours. They made their escape after killing 26 personnel of the Chitral Scouts. Though the security forces claimed to have killed 40 militants, locals in Arandu confirmed only five deaths.
The aftermath of the attack was more of a futile exercise than a precautionary measure. Additional forces, after reaching the battle scene in Arandu, destroyed suspended bridges on the Chitral river to avoid another round of fighting. About 200 families in the locality were forced to leave. The official machinery was mobilised once the militants had crossed the border, and this operation was largely a success for the militants. Darudshud was the only security post where two soldiers fought bravely to kill a few militants.
Why didn’t the forces respond befittingly despite apparently having prior information? Officials in Chitral said that front-line security was on high alert. However, a few days after the attack, a man who had been posted at one of the targeted checkpoints in Arandu told me that “red alerts are so common here that we have become insensitive to such calls”.
This justification is, of course, not the whole truth. Nevertheless, it reflects the overall lethargy of the security apparatus in the bordering districts.
Similarly, an intelligence operative in Darosh accepted that he had information about terrorist support networks in different localities. Nevertheless, “I fear that if my information does not mobilise the authorities, it would certainly mobilise the terrorists against me,” he said. (Organised attacks by militants from Afghanistan stopped once a contingent of the regular army was sent to the north-western borders).
The Bannu jailbreak was hardly a match to what happened in Chitral. However, this organised attack in the settled district was a replica of the strategy applied by the Swat Taliban from Afghanistan last year. Both reflect the lack of a proactive approach on the part of the security establishment.
Lessons learnt from the first incident would have helped avoid the second tragedy. In both cases, for example, a sizable number of security personnel were absent from duty when the militants put their plan into action. This factor alone must have weakened the morale of the remaining soldiers.
But this is not the end of it. Another major factor is the suspected presence of Taliban sympathisers inside the security apparatus, which if true would keep the militants well-informed — at the expense of official security commitment.
The video of the Bannu jailbreak has shown that the militants had a detailed map of the complex structure, which helped them to hit the key security points and pinpoint the location of their comrades. The attack led to the release of almost 400 criminals, including some high-profile terrorists like Adnan Rashid.
After holding a special cabinet meeting on the jailbreak, ANP’s information minister, Mian Iftikhar, denied the militants’ allegations that police officials were bribed to facilitate them in carrying out the jailbreak.
However, the minister touched upon a more sensitive topic: he made it clear that some elements in Islamabad had helped Adnan Rashid by shifting him from Adiyala Jail in Rawalpindi to the Central Jail in Peshawar and then to the relatively insecure jail in Bannu.
Last year, the same allegations were levelled against some officials when two notorious criminals fled under mysterious circumstances from Peshawar Central Jail after being transferred from Adiyala Jail.
Given the circumstances, the security apparatus in the province and the country can hardly afford laxity in defending vulnerable official installations. It’s hard to find a silver lining, though. Militants at the gates of settled districts are hurling threats of more attacks in their propaganda videos.
Perhaps it is time to shift the focus away from discussing the militants’ strength in taking on the state. More important is the plugging of holes in the weak security apparatus, which has repeatedly failed to perceive and respond to outside threats.
The writer teaches at Peshawar University.
Source
http://dawn.com/2012/06/11/weak-security-apparatus/