THE LAHORE LOG: Opportunistic politicians are enabling terrorism By Najam Sethi

Pakistani Shiites demand protection from hardline Sunni groups after a recent bomb killed 85 people in Quetta

Two types of terrorists have laid Pakistan low. The first grouping consists of the Tehreek I Taliban (TTP), comprising over a dozen significant commanders operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The second is a monolithic anti-Shia sectarian outfit operating under the banner of the Lashkar e Jhangvi, with legal outfits like the ASWJ fronting for it.
The TTP has killed over 30,000 civilians and 3,000 military personnel since 2008, when it surfaced in Swat and later moved to Waziristan. The LeJ's origins are in Jhang, Punjab, but it has become lethally active in Karachi and Quetta since last year when it target-killed over 500 Shias across the country.

On face value, their methods - IUDs, suicide missions, ambushes - are similar. But their motives and objectives are different.

The TTP is waging war against Pakistan, its people, constitution, political system, government and security agencies. It focuses on FATA and KP province although its presence is ominous in other parts like Islamabad and Punjab.
The LeJ, however, is only targeting Shias. It is focused on Sindh in the south, Balochistan in the centre and Gilgit-Baltistan province in the north. Only 10 per cent of its attacks are in the Punjab where it is headquartered.
In reality, there is an umbilical link between the TTP and the LeJ. Both use the services and expertise of Al-Qaeda militants from Central Asia and the Middle-East. Both are hard-line Sunni extremists.
Both have significant former Jehadi elements from the Punjab in their rank and file. Both have direct and indirect, past and present, operational links to the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and FATA. And both have operational links to Pakistan's military intelligence agencies because of their past anti-India jehadi politics in Kashmir, and current anti-American tactical alliances with Afghan Taliban based in Waziristan.
In order to combat them effectively, it is important to understand their strategic links. Thus, a forceful combination of political will, police action, strong anti-terrorism laws and civil-military intel can yield dividends against the LeJ.
But challenging the TTP requires, additionally, a degree of conventional military force and administrative resourcefulness. Unfortunately, however, the political will to confront either is lacking, the military force to subdue them is not forthcoming and administrative lethargy and due legal process are stumbling blocks.

Imran Khan and the media have nurtured the displacement of public belief that the TTP phenomenon is a direct backlash of US drone strikes

Two recent developments explain the civil-military problematic. The military would like to crush the TTP but doesn't want to pit its forces against the TTP Islamists without popular support and government approval.
But the government is wary of extending approval for a military operation because public support is not forthcoming. Indeed, most Pakistanis are still in favour of negotiating peace deals with the TTP because they mistakenly believe that the TTP phenomenon is a direct backlash of US drone strikes and will melt away once the Americans exit the region by 2014.
Imran Khan and the media have played big roles in nurturing such misplaced concreteness. This explains why the ANP, an avowedly secular and anti-TTP party that has long advocated military action against them, felt the need to organise an All Parties Conference in Peshawar last week that unanimously approved negotiating peace with the TTP instead of using military force.
A more opportunist strategy cannot be countenanced - on the eve of the elections the politicians don't want to be targeted by the TTP or face the prospect of no-go areas for electioneering purposes.
Much the same dilemma exists in the battle against the LeJ. There is no effective counter-terrorism unit with physical, financial or forensic training to take it on.
Therefore, the Punjab's politicians and police have turned a blind eye in exchange for an understanding that the LeJ voter in 40 constituencies will vote for the PMLN, whose leaders won't be targeted.
The situation is complicated in Karachi where the police and government are ill-organised and weak-kneed, while the city is terrorized by half a dozen militant organisations with overlapping criminal, ethnic and sectarian agendas.
In Balochistan, the consequences of the End Game in Afghanistan (Balochistan's contiguity to Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan), Pipeline Politics (US opposition to Iran's quest for energy outlets via Balochistan), and the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia (which is a source of funding for the LeJ) and its Gulf allies (like Bahrain, which is recruiting LeJ supporters into its repressive police and security apparatus as an insurance policy against its radical pro-Iran majority Shia population), impinge on the local situation.
Matters are worsened by the Pakistani military's suspicions of the Persian-speaking Shia Hazara community in Balochistan that is both anti- Afghan Taliban (Pakistani assets) and pro-Iran, which has become an excuse not to single out the Hazara for special treatment.
Faced with angry protests across the country, the government has responded with face-saving transfers and postings. A couple of raids have also been conducted for good measure. But this is too little too late.
Until Pakistan is able to establish well-funded, trained and motivated counter-terrorism force units along the line of Western countries, backed by a national consensus and full civil-military cooperation, terrorism will increase and exact a heavy toll of lives and properties in Pakistan. 

The writer is Editor, The Friday Times

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