Cancerous Pakistan’s Ambidextrous Taliban & Jihadist Policies: Threat to the subcontinent

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Frontier India - Nation States normally adopt consistent internal and external policies after prolonged deliberations (in case there is democracy) and near-national consensus. The parameters are determined by geopolitical, geostrategic and global parabola of power equation and power-block determinants. It is believed that Pakistan decided to cast its lot with the western powers, allegedly as against India’s nearness to the USSR. Pakistan’s membership of SEATO and CENTO was dictated by its geostrategic policy of aligning with the “Free West” as against the Communist “Iron Curtain.” Pakistan had considerably gained from these alliances in the form of grants, aids and assurance of security umbrella. However, when it failed to garner war materials during 1965 and 1971 wars against India, Pakistan leaned towards China and to some extent North Korea for augmenting its missile power, armament supply (including aircrafts) and nuclear capability.

That Pakistan was in cahoots with China, North Korea and was gaining nuclear capability through the acts of international thievery by Dr. A. Q. Khan was well known to the CIA and other western intelligence agencies. They did nothing to prevent Pakistan from inducting M 11 missile, Chinese aircrafts and enriched uranium from a plant jointly run by Pakistan and China in Chinese territory.

This strategy suited USA and its allies to allow Pakistan to be nuclear capable for matching India’s nuclear programme. Pakistan continued to act as a surrogate nation of the USA (and allies) and embraced its western allies firmly after the USSR intervened in Afghanistan. USSR’s intervention threatened the west that the giant communist block was trying to seek access to the hot waters via Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan’s neighbor Iran had ran foul of the British and US oil empires when Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh nationalized the oil industry and the western powers orchestrated a coup d’tat in 1953. Mossaddegh was ousted and a puppet Mohammad Reza Shah Pahalvi, a dictator, was installed as king. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolutionary coup had minimized most western influence on Iran. Pakistan and USA and Saudi Arabia assessed that the anti-Washington regime in Iran might allow access to Moscow to tap its oil resources and gain access the hot waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It was decided to intervene in Afghanistan.

The story of US and Saudi intervention in Afghanistan using Pakistan as a conduit had initiated the process of Jihad renaissance and rebirth of Islamic terrorism, which is plaguing the world even now. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations were in the limbo because of the issues of validity of the Durand Line drawn by the British in 1893 rather arbitrarily and the ambition of the Pakhtun peoples living in Afghanistan and Pakistan to have an independent homeland. Pakistan availed of the opportunity offered by joint US/Saudi adventure in Afghanistan for consolidating its hold on the seven prime mujahideen groups that operated against Soviet intervention. After 1988 agreement the Soviet troops started withdrawing from Afghanistan after being severely mauled by the mujahideen, Pakistan army regulars, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami. Al Badr (all Pakistani created jihad outfits) and ISI irregulars.

Internecine fighting between the mujahidden groups and strong emergence of the Northern Alliance (backed by India and Russia) had clogged up all trade routes between Pakistan and the Central Asian countries and Turkestan. During Benazir Bhutto’s tenure (1993-94) General Akbar Khan and the ISI chief Hamid Gul and Parvez Mohammad (later President) and Nasarullah Babar the interior minister conspired to support the Taliban (all trained in Pakistan) with a view to achieving three objectives: Opening the trade route to Turkestan through Kandahar and Heart; creating a heavily supported force that could capture power in Kabul (as against the moderate mujahideen leaders) and train Markaz ud Dawa al Irshad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, HUJI, HUA etc jihadis in Afghan camps and depute them to Kashmir. The idea was conceived by Kargil culprit Musharraf and Benazir had blessed it.

According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid between 1994 and 1996, the USA supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-Western. Between 1995 and 1997, US support was even more driven because of its backing for the Unocal (pipeline) project. He notes that many US diplomats “saw them as messianic do-gooders—like born-again Christians from the American Bible Belt.” (Dreyfuss, 2005, pp. 326). Selig Harrison, a long-time regional expert with extensive CIA ties, later said that he complained at the time about how Pakistani ISI support of the Taliban was backed by the CIA. “I warned them that we were creating a monster.” (Times of India, 3/7/2001). There is evidence to prove that CIA had helped supply the Taliban with weapons during the initial period of their rise to power.

Creation of the Taliban by Pakistan with US aids has been documented by various contemporary authors. Pakistan was one of the three countries which maintained diplomatic relationship with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In 2001, after Al Qaeda (based in Afghanistan) attack on Trade Centre towers on 9/11 the USA declared war against the Taliban regime and told Pakistan “to be with us or against us.” General Musharraf, one of the creators of the Frankenstein, had little option but to cooperate with the USA.

However, Pakistan had not cut the umbilical with Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani factions of the Taliban. In addition, after 2001 the Al Qaeda shifted its base to Pakistan and inspired by the jihad ambience in Pakistan and Afghanistan the tribal areas of FATA and NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Provinces. Gradually, taking queue from ISI managed Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, HUJI, al Badr etc jihadi organizations the Taliban movement in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan-TTP) started rooting in Punjab province. Youths from Punjab were recruited and trained in FATA and South and North Waziristan camps. Besides the TTP, banned organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipaha Sahaba and Lashkar al Islam have been revitalized. These organizations are engaged in sectarian violence, suppression of the minorities and innumerable acts of crime. They move freely with weapons and cause devastating bomb blasts against government targets.

Pakistan has been following dual Counterinsurgency (COIN) and fomenting insurgency (FOIN) policies at home against the jihadi militants. Under US pressure Pakistan had pressed in the armed forces in Swat, Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand etc agencies against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. They seemingly gained territory and killed over 7000 people and rendered nearly more than quarter of a million people homeless. Combined with ground and air attack by Pakistan US drone attacks also took toll of some TTP leaders and cadres.

The funny part is that while campaigning against the TTP Pakistan did not seal the borders to prevent the TTP to escape to Afghanistan and tie up with Omar and Haqqani group Talibans. Though under pressure from USA, Pakistan did not take any discernable action against the Al Qaeda camps and hideouts of the Arab, Chechen, Uyghur, Uzbek etc foreign jihadists that swelled up the strength of Osama bin Laden. Hilary Clinton had recently lamented that if not higher politicians certain Pakistani officials were aware of the abodes of Osama and Al Qaeda in Pakistan-presumably in the bordering areas of Chitral and Afghan territory.

Under intense US pressure Pakistan army moved against the TTP in South Waziristan and proclaimed victory. It is yet to move against the North Waziristan, bordering Afghanistan. It is believed that Al Qaeda, HUJI, TTP and Afghan Talibans have established firm bases in these tracts. It is interesting to note that Jalaluddin Haqqani group of Afghan Taliban is basically based in North Waziristan. They often operate in Afghanistan under Pakistani guidance and retreat to Pakistan. It is generally believed that the ISI had used Haqqani group for attacking Indian embassy in Kabul and other Indian targets in Paktia and Kabul areas of Afghanistan.

While there are undoubted links between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, they appear to be sufficiently distinct for the Pakistani military and ISI to treat them very differently.

Most studies support existence of relationship of co-existence between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban, and suggest that individuals or elements within, or connected to, the ISI and Pakistani military support or advise the insurgents. As per a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, many analysts believe that Pakistan’s intelligence services know the whereabouts of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate that elements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban. However, a 2010 Crisis Research Center (US) report suggests that: ‘Pakistan appears to have shifted somewhat to actively assisting the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan.’

The author Ahmed Rashid argued recently (The Washington Post, 27 April 2010) that: ‘Taliban leaders and their families live in Pakistan and are in close touch with the military and the ISI. Some Taliban allies, such as the network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, are even closer to the ISI. Although the military is finally hunting down the Pakistani Taliban in the Northwest tribal areas, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani extremists in Punjab province are being left alone.’

While we propose to discuss in depth the duplicitous policy of Pakistan towards Afghan Taliban and Afghanistan we would like to focus on the national security priority of Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic national priorities are manifold:1. Consider India as a prime hostile country and assign greatest importance to national defensive and offensive preparations aimed at India. For this purpose Pakistan requires, besides its regular army, assistance from auxiliary armed forces created by it in the form of Markaz ud Dawa, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Herbal Mujahideen, al Badr and HUJI. Besides infiltrating these forces in Indian Kashmir, Pakistan has the capability of directing these auxiliary forces in different parts of India with helps from subverted Indian Muslims.

2. Assigning focus of Kashmir and convey messages to US and other western countries, the Arab countries & Muslim nations that unless Kashmir issue is settled to its satisfaction Pakistan would continue to maintain auxiliary armies and its linkages with Taliban.

3. Pakistan is determined to maintain its dominant position inside Afghanistan. Though compelled by USA to fight the Taliban’s, Pakistan has focused only on the TTP forces. It has not involved its resources against Mullah Omar group of Afghan Taliban and also the Haqqani group of Taliban. While US intelligence avers that both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are sheltered in the shadow areas of Pak-Afghan border Pakistan has not moved against them. On the other hand Haqqani group is stationed in North Waziristan. Recent studies have unraveled the connectivity between the Afghan Taliban and the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan. We propose to examine this in later paragraphs.

4. Pakistan is preparing to generate political and military bases in Afghanistan keeping in perspective the abrupt or gradual withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2011 or at a later date. Since the USA and the Afghan government initiated the process of talks with Afghan Taliban Pakistan had struck the first blow by arresting Mullah Abdul Ghana Bandar in Karachi. Mullah Bandar belongs to the same branch of Duran tribe as President Karzai is. They were in close touch. Pakistan did not want to be left out of the “peace initiative.” Mullah Baradar’s arrest would signal to other Taliban leaders, including the reclusive Mullah Muhammad Omar, about Pakistan’s capability of flexing its muscles to convince them to adopt a “reasonable” position in any negotiations, turn convincingly against al Qaeda, and ensure Pakistan’s interests are safeguarded in any attempt at a political settlement. But this would be a high-risk gamble. The warning implicit in Mullah Baradar’s arrest could just as easily persuade other Taliban leaders that it is too risky to rise above the surface enough to engage in talks, and they might be better off lying low and waiting out U.S.-led troops until they begin to leave. It also removes from the scene a man who, some argue, could otherwise have been used as a go-between in any talks. Some Taliban leaders expressed that if they did not carry out ISI’s dictate they were killed by rival groups loyal to the ISA.

5. Pakistan cannot digest India’s significant presence in Afghanistan “in the ruse” of collaborating in development works. Pakistan is aware that India has developed close ties with the elements of the “Northern Alliance” and is engaged in cultivating several sub-clans of the Pushtun people. Pakistan alleges that India is building up military potential in Afghanistan and from bases in Tajikistan. It also castigates India for using the Afghan territory for supporting the Baloch revolutionary groups. To counteract Indian presence Pakistan has started deputing the Lashkar-e-Taiba jihadists to Afghanistan in collaboration with the Talibans. It is alleged that some elements of serving Pakistan army are also masquerading as Lashkar operatives.

According to Alissa J Rubin, NYT News Service, Jun 17, 2010 LeT presence in Afghanistan has considerably increased. According to her study, “The group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, is believed to have planned or executed three major attacks against Indian government employees and private workers in Afghanistan in recent months, according to Afghan and international intelligence officers and diplomats here. It continues to track Indian development workers and others for possible attack, they said… A number of experts now say LeT presents more of a threat in Afghanistan than even al-Qaida does, because its operatives are from the region, less readily identified and less resented than Arabs who make up al-Qaida’s ranks. There were a few LeT cells in Afghanistan three or four years ago, but they were not focused on Indian targets and, until recently, their presence seemed to be diminishing.

‘They are active now in six or eight provinces’ in Afghanistan, said a senior Nato intelligence official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity.”

The ISI and Taliban nexus have been studied in depth by Haider A Mullick of JSOU (Joint Special Operations University-2009) and Matt Welden of Crisis State Research Centre (2010). Matt Welden had interviewed several Afghan Taliban leaders. His findings are revealing and shocking. According to him: “Through providing sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban, and arresting those who step out of line, the ISI appears to be able to exert significant influence on Taliban strategy. As a Kandahari political figure summarised: ‘The ISI have some control [over the Taliban]. They have influence in strategic decision-making. Sure, they have dominated the Taliban movement, but they [the Taliban] have some independence.’ Likewise, a political analyst in Kandahar said: ‘The Taliban is obliged to accept Pakistan’s demands – it needs their support, but is not their puppet.’

The Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on mutual benefit. The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical support to sustain their insurgency; the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied force in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and ‘strategic depth’ in their rivalry with India. As a former Taliban minister put it: ‘The ISI are helping the Taliban a lot, but they only give for their own gain. There is a reciprocal issue: Kashmir. The root of the problem in Afghanistan is the Pakistan-India competition.’ Pakistan’s fundamental strategic calculus does not appear to have altered significantly since the 1970s. According to Steve Coll (The New Yorker, 24 May 2010) earlier this year Pakistan submitted a briefing to the US on its national interests in the Afghan conflict, which reportedly, ‘reflects one overriding concern: India.’ Indeed, in February 2010, the US Director of National Intelligence confirmed: ‘Islamabad’s conviction that militant groups are an important part of its strategic arsenal to counter India’s military and economic advantages’. As Steve Coll explains (The New Yorker, 1 March 2010): ‘Pakistan’s generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and distasteful Islamist militias such as the Taliban may be, they could yet be useful proxies to ward off a perceived existential threat from India. In the Army’s view, at least, that threat has not receded.”

Several reputed researchers like Johnson and Mason (2008); Antonio Giustozzi (2007) and Seth Jones have pointed out direct ISI involvement with the Afghan Taliban. There are reports that ISI officials attended the top representative body of the Taliban Quetta Shura in the recent past. The Quetta Shura is widely believed to comprise around a dozen or so members who meet several times a year; while certain members and sub-committees may meet more frequently. It was strongly suggested by Matt Welden that that the ISI has representatives on the Shura, either as participants or observers, and the agency is thus involved at the highest level of the movement. Significantly, even a limited ISI presence on the Shura would allow the agency to monitor the Shura’s decisions and take steps against members who are not perceived to be acting in Pakistan’s interests.

A former deputy minister under the former Taliban regime and who frequently liaises with the Taliban, said that three to seven ISI officials attend the Quetta Shura as observers. He believes that the ISI has responsibility for organising the meetings and that it exerts pressure on individual participants beforehand, especially if major decisions are to be taken. An Afghan conflict analyst, with years of experience in southern Afghanistan and contacts with the Taliban, concurred, pointing out that the ISI, use people who have the same appearance, language, behaviour, and habits as Afghans. They wouldn’t be strange to the Talibs, who seem to them to be Muslims, also fighting infidels. Besides Quetta the ISI is represented in the Miramshah and Peshawar Shura of the Taliban.

The ISI officials often chose targets of attack get the target surveyed and train and arm the Talibans to attack and destroy the target. For such collaboration Pakistan often offers the strike commanders $ 25,000 to 30,000 and reward and incentive. Often strategic supplies are pumped into Afghanistan to bolster up the fighting morale of the Taliban commanders.

Pakistan has kept the Taliban groups divided into smaller and manageable fighting components. The ISI often orders attacks on Indian targets, civilians, esteemed maulanas who do not support wanton violence. Foot soldiers and junior commanders refusing to obey ISI orders are eliminated brutally. Out of nearly 2.5 million Afghans still in Pakistan the ISI recruits Taliban fighters from amongst them and deputes them to Southern and central Afghanistan. In the eastern provinces ISI commands the loyalty of over 1500 Taliban army headed by Jalaluddin Haqqani. According to Ahmed Rashid (2008) ‘by 2004 they [the US and NATO] had confirmed reports of the ISI running training camps for Taliban recruits north of Quetta, funds and arms shipments arriving from the Gulf countries, and shopping sprees in Quetta and Karachi in which the Taliban bought hundreds of motorbikes, pickup trucks and satellite phones. American soldiers at firebases along the border in eastern Afghanistan and US drones in the skies watched as army trucks delivered fighters to the border at night to infiltrate Afghanistan and then recovered them on their return a few days later. Pakistani artillery gave covering fire to Taliban infiltrators crossing into Afghanistan, and medical facilities were set up close to the border by the army for wounded Taliban.’

Hundreds of Talibans are trained in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta madrasas and then taken to forward bases for arms training. They are supplied with motor cycles, pickup vans and satellite phones besides weapons. Often ISI officers are attached with these groups. In March 2010 the New York Times reported that western officials believe ‘Colonel Imam’, a senior former ISI official, continued to train, recruit and finance the insurgents. Along with a number of other retired Pakistani intelligence officials, they say, he had helped the Taliban stage a remarkable comeback.

America has pumped in 11.6 billion in security (military) related aids and $ 6 billons in economic aides. Though Obama has proclaimed binding relationship with Pakistan and expressed hopes of future strategic collaboration, even a naïve observer can see how much of the aid are used for economic uplift of the Pakistani people, how much are diverted to arm the armed forces to meet “Indian Challenges” and how much diverted to maintain the Afghani Talibans and LeT like outfits acting as proxy army of Pakistan.

The paradoxical situation reached a pinnacle when Asif Ali Zardari, President, visited a jail where about 600 Talibans were incarcerated. He told them that they were Pakistan’s own people but were arrested under intense pressure of America. He promised to release them in batches; the minor elements first and the senior leaders later. Surprisingly about 300 Talibans were released soon after Zardari’s visit to the jail.

Pakistan is playing the dual game of fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) against the Pakistani Talibans and pursuing the dirty game of fomenting insurgency (FOIN). No doubt it fought TTP in Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand Miramshah, and South Waziristan areas. But it is now understood that sections of Pak Taliban have developed nexus with Afghan Talibans and recently they captured 35 personnel of Pakistan Frontier Guards. These captured soldiers have not yet been released. On the other hand TTP has started spreading in Punjab. The Punjabi speaking Northern and central Punjabi tanzeems and the Seraiki speaking southern Punjabis are dominating the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jais-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipaha Sahaba outfits. On the lure of cash incentive most of these elements have started veering around TTP and the outfit is styled as Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab.

According to Nazam Sethi (Daily Times 18.06.10), “Another worrying aspect vis-à-vis the terrorist nexus is the emergence of the Punjabi Taliban, a loose terror network that is spread all over the country. This group is not only in cahoots with the Pakistani Taliban but they also have suspected links with al Qaeda. It is about time that the so-called assets of the state like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba are disbanded and crushed. These groups have enjoyed state patronage for years. Pakistan has suffered enough at the hands of its skewed foreign policy goals. We cannot afford to do so anymore. Enough is enough. Let our soil be finally cleansed of our sins of the past.” But saner people like Sethi are not heard in Pakistan. Policy matters are decided by Pakistani armed forces.

Pakistan itself, India and Afghanistan have been affected by Pakistan’s FOIN policy as a part of its national security doctrine. In Pakistan it created LeT, JeM, LeJ, HUJI and Sipaha Sahaba etc outfits. These very forces, except the main body of LeT have gone out of control. They are creating serious internal security problems for Pakistan. The TTP was originally created for aiding the Afghan Talibans and fighting against India. Gradually under Al Qaeda and Taliban influence the TTP contingents turned the guns against Pakistan with a view to establishing a pure Islamic State. The splinter TTP groups are now combined with splinter groups of other jihadi assets of Pakistan. Punjab and most of Sind have been affected by terrorist violence and target killings. It appears that the State of Pakistan is withering away.

Pakistan’s FOIN policies in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo have been well documented. Its FOIN policy against India has been continuously chronicled. Starting from Naga rebellion and escape of Phizo to Pakistan in 1948 to ravaging insurgency movements in the northeast have become integral parts of India’s internal security concerns. Pakistani collaboration, often punctuated by Chinese involvement has created several cancerous terrorist movements. This is a tremendous success story of Pakistan, especially of the ISI.

Pakistan’s FOIN operations in Punjab (1984-1992) was aimed at training, equipping and funding groups of Sikh separatists which was whipped up by a fundamentalist preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Thousands of lives were lost and finally the movement was brought under control. However, even now nearly 32 important separatist Sikh leaders are hosted by the ISI in and around Lahore. Occasional attempts are made to infiltrate terrorists with weapons and explosives for reviving the separatist movement. Among important leaders are Lakhbir Singh (nephew of Bhindranwale), Wadhwa Singh, Mehal Singh, (Babbar Khalsa), Paramjit Singh Panjwar (KCF), Ranjit Singh Neeta (Khalistan Zindabad Force) etc.

In Kashmir Pakistani involvement started immediately after partition, when the Mehsud tribal bandits were sent to invade Kashmir. Indian army intervention defeated Pakistani design partially. Since then the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) of the ISI has been deputing own agents, trained terrorists to create an ambience of insurgency. However, large scale FOIN operations were started from 1988 with the help of JKLF and splinter terrorist groups. Hizbul Mujahideen was created and housed in Pak occupied Kashmir and recruits were raised from Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Taiba and HUJI were launched in 1992-93 by the ISI in collaboration with Markaz ud Dawa al Irshad and Al Qaeda. These auxiliary forces were trained by serving and retired ISI and army officers in POK and Afghanistan camps. They were infiltrated in Kashmir and other parts of India. Often Nepal and Bangladesh were used for infiltration and arms and explosive supplies.

Another area of Pakistani FOIN operation targets the vulnerable Indian Muslim groups. Between 1990 and present day about 8 tanzeems were created in Kerala, 6 in Karnataka and Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh. There are about 9 active Muslim militant groups in Assam, Manipur and West Bengal. These groups are buttresses by Bangladeshi HUJI, Jamait ul Mujahideen, Hizbut Tehrir, Allahar Dal (party of Allah) groups. These groups are aligned with LeT and Al Qaeda. I have detailed these aspects in my book Fulcrum of Evil-ISI, CIA, Al Qaeda Nexus and a largish essay ‘Fulcrum of the Eastern Dark’ that can be found in the archive of this website. In the same process Pakistan succeeded in radicalising the Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Scores of SIMI activists were trained in Pakistan. After SIMI was banned it changed over to Indian Mujahideen and carried out several acts of violence.

Through the process of religious preaching, propaganda materials, financial support and internet propaganda Pakistan and related Islamists have succeeded in replanting the seeds of secessionism amongst certain sections of the Indian Muslims. In these very subverted pockets Pakistan’s FOIN operators have established cells and modules of terrorist and separatist outfits including the HUJI, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Ahl-e-Hadith. The network is on the increase. The impact is felt more certain districts of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, UP, Maharashtra, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh as well as Delhi NCR.

Pakistan must rethink its national security perspective and put halt to arming itself to the teeth with generous and foolish US gifts and Chinese helping hands. Pakistan has not given up the NS policy of retaking entire Kashmir through FOIN and direct military operations. Its increased nuclear capability (more than India), missile power and fresh nuclear aid from China indicate that Pakistan would gear up for a “Final war of all wars.”

Its perspective that India is abetting Balochistan insurgency, simmering discontent in Sind, rising militancy in Punjab and increased Taliban activities in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa areas is not substantiated by ground realities. Pakistan must understand that its internal COIN policy cannot succeed if it simultaneously plays the duplicitous policy of FOIN in Afghanistan and India. It is now confirmed that Pakistan has deputed large contingents of LeT to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Afghan guerrillas. Its FOIN policy is dictated by the urge of maintaining control on the Taliban and enhances Pakistani presence in Afghanistan with a view to establishing its hegemony on the troubled country after US and NATO withdrawal. Washington and Obama are not fools not to understand the endgame in Afghanistan. Sooner than later they have to seek a roadmap to exit honourably.

“Meanwhile, terror groups that had been established and supported by the Pakistani establishment to do its bidding in India, Kashmir and Afghanistan turn their guns and their bombs on Pakistani security forces and civilians, killing thousands. This is the problem with developing a security framework without any reference to the people and the political leadership. The military, smug in the belief that only it knows what’s good for the country, has continued to run a secretive, rogue policy that contravenes international law as well as Pakistan’s own interests…

With the Afghan endgame now clearly in sight, it is all the more necessary that India, Pakistan and Afghanistan must resolve their differences and come to some understanding irrespective of the military and domestic compulsions of Nato states active in the region. Unfortunately, the zero-sum game that has characterised Indo-Pak relations will probably prevent this logical convergence of interests.” (Endgame in Afghanistan, Irfan Husain, Dawn 19.06.2010).

So, the people of the extended subcontinent stand on the verge of diplomatic, political, military and fragile internal security collapse in view of Pakistan’s ambidextrous COIN and FOIN policies pursued at home, in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan army and the ISI have nearly ignited the dry powder keg. We have to wait for the devastating blast that might engulf the extended subcontinent. India stands more vulnerable.